Signing & Proof

How research records are signed and proven

Signing methods are optimized to achieve a degree of certainty beyond reasonable legal doubt. The system uses two levels: a daily seal signed by the operator, and a global anchor from an independent timestamping authority. Together they prove what was done, when it was done, and that it has not been altered.

Overview

WorkSigned generates a tamper-proof signed research record designed to withstand legal challenge. These properties make the record difficult to dispute:

Tamper-proof timestamps. Each day's record is signed by the operator and independently timestamped by a Timestamping Authority (TSA).

Chained signing. Chained signatures prove to reviewers that no data was omitted. Each link of the chain is timestamped daily to prove the accuracy of the record's timeline.

Unaltered web interactions. AI conversations, emails, and web searches pass through a local relay ("Witness") server that signs them on arrival. The researcher has no access to the relay, making these records tamper-proof and difficult to challenge.

Per-item tamper detection. Each item within the record is bound to each day's signature via a Merkle path (a method to combine many signatures into one). Any change to a single item is immediately detectable.

The methods

WorkSigned uses standard, publicly documented cryptographic primitives. There are no proprietary algorithms. Every step can be reproduced and verified by anyone.

SHA-256 hashing. Every tracked item is reduced to a 32-byte hash the moment it is captured. Any change to the content, even a single byte, produces a different hash. This is the same algorithm mandated by the US Federal Government (FIPS 180-4) and used in TLS and NIST-approved document systems.

RS256 digital signatures (RSA-2048). The operator signs each day's seal with a private key. The public key is published. Anyone can verify the signature is authentic. This is the same standard used by TLS certificates and eIDAS-qualified electronic signatures.

Timestamping (RFC 3161). WorkSigned sends the global root hash to an independent Timestamping Authority (TSA) once per day. The TSA returns a signed token binding that hash to a time from its own clock. The TSA is a separate legal entity, often eIDAS-qualified, and is not controlled by WorkSigned or the researcher.

Merkle trees. WorkSigned arranges a day's hashes in a binary tree. The root is one 32-byte value representing the entire day's content. A Merkle tree lets a third party prove a specific item was in the signed set without downloading the whole set.

The daily seal

At the end of each day, WorkSigned collects every content hash captured that day: file versions, database views, email records, AI chat sessions, and web searches. It arranges them in a Merkle tree. The root, along with a manifest, is combined into one 32-byte value called the DAY FINAL.

The DAY FINAL is chained to the previous day's. Day N's seal includes day N-1's seal. If any day is deleted or altered, the next day's signature will not verify.

The operator signs the DAY FINAL with their RSA-2048 private key. The signed receipt, manifest, and public key are stored in the researcher's local database.

Each item can be proven independently. Any single file or record can be shown to be part of the signed day's root using only its own Merkle path (a few hundred bytes). A missing or corrupted local file does not invalidate the rest of the day.

The witness server

AI conversations, emails, and web searches are signed before they reach the researcher's machine. The locally hosted witness server acts as a relay for this data and hashes each item on arrival. This makes the research record tamper proof and difficult to challenge.

This secure relay server is the only network infrastructure that the institution must install. This makes all claims by the record - such as "this research work only used an online AI service for drafting - but the ideas and work were all done by us" - much more defensible. We are able to argue: "The researcher has no access to the relay server; thus the AI conversation records they hold should be accurate due to the design of this service; thus their claims can be considered to be accurate unless proven otherwise." The same method is applied to research email and web searches.

The global anchor

Every day, WorkSigned collects all users' daily seals into a global Merkle tree. It takes one TSA timestamp over the root. This is the global anchor: the time reference for the entire platform that day, regardless of how many researchers sealed.

The global log is chained across days. Today's global hash includes yesterday's. If any day's entry is deleted or altered, the next day's chain will not verify.

Verification

A third party (a court, an auditor, a grant agency) can verify any day of a researcher's record using only the small receipt. No network access is required.

The verification consists of five steps run via a single click. First, verify the operator's RS256 signature over the day's canonical string. Second, check the personal hash chain: today's DAY FINAL includes yesterday's, so any gap is detected. Third, walk the Merkle path from the researcher's signature to the global root. Fourth, prove any specific file into the day's signed root via its own Merkle path. Fifth, verify the TSA token: its embedded hash must match the global chain hash, and the certificate chain must be valid.

All of this works offline. The verifier needs the receipt (about 5 KB per day) and the file content they want to check. No server access, no operator private key, no full global log. Verification is deterministic: the same inputs always produce the same result.

Why this is court-recognized

SHA-256 is an approved hash function by NIST (FIPS 180-4). RS256 is the signature algorithm in TLS 1.2 and 1.3. RFC 3161 timestamping is the standard for qualified electronic time stamps in the EU and is being adopted in US court proceedings. Merkle trees are a standard data structure in cryptography, used in Bitcoin's lightweight verification protocol.

There are no proprietary algorithms and no single point of failure. The trust model has three parts: the operator's signature key, the operator's integrity, and the TSA's clock. Each is a standard, auditable assumption. If any one is compromised, the others still hold. The record is stored locally on the researcher's machine, so it is accessible as long as the record is intact.